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Job Stability among U.S. University Presidents 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines job duration among U.S. university presidents from 2001 to 
2006.  Using data from the American Council of Education’s Survey of American 
College Presidents, this analysis finds that public university presidents are 
approximately 50 percent more likely to leave office than are their private 
university counterparts.  This turnover translates into average job spells that are 
approximately 20 percent shorter for public university presidents.  This job 
instability appears primarily to be driven by the higher propensity for public 
university presidents to leave one institution to become president at another 
institution.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A number of studies have analyzed the increasing turnover rate of the United States job market.  
These studies have attempted to quantify the growth of job insecurity and instability and to 
identify its underlying causes.1  A related vein of literature has examined individual labor 
markets and changes (or lack thereof) in job tenure in particular occupations or industries.2  The 
tertiary education industry has largely been exempt from these analyses for a number of perhaps 
contradictory reasons.  For one, an increasing percentage of the higher education work force is 
composed of part-time and full-time temporary workers.  For example, in 1975 only 30.2 percent 
of faculty were part-time and 13 percent were full-time temporary.  By 2005, according to 
calculations by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) based on U.S. 
Department of Education, IPEDS Fall Staff surveys, fully 48 percent and 20.1 percent were part-
time or full-time temporary, respectively.  Clearly, average job duration is declining and the 
likelihood of job turnover is increasing among faculty.  On the other hand, a significant percent 
of faculty have tenure and thus their jobs are considered virtually immune from market forces 
that might negatively influence turnover.   
 While faculty labor markets may be the focus of most of the existing analyses of 
academic labor markets, they clearly are not the only employees in higher education.  A 
prominent employee on every campus of course is the university president (or chancellor).  
Ironically, the labor market for university presidents has received scant analysis by researchers of 
higher education (unlike CEOs in the for profit sector).  The conventional wisdom is that the 
                                                     
1
 See Farber (2008) and Neumark (2000) for a survey of this literature. 
2
 A few examples are Lawless and Murphy (2008), Hicks (2007), Konzelmann, Wilkinson, and Mankelow (2007), 
Whitebook and Sakai (2004),  Sauer (1998). 
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academic executive office has become more unstable over time.  What remains less well known 
are the individual and institutional attributes that are related to presidential job stability.  There is 
a growing literature and understanding of significant differences in remuneration and labor 
market conditions in the private versus the public college and university sectors.  This literature 
has again focused primarily on faculty and the growing salary premium at private universities 
versus public universities (see Alexander (2001), and Zogbi (2003)).  There are, however, a few 
studies that have analyzed the remuneration of university presidents.  Unfortunately, most of 
these studies, due to data limitations focused solely on private university presidents, and the 
attributes that determine their compensation.  
 The job turnover and stability of the higher education’s chief executives is less well 
understood.  This study fills this void in the literature by examining the job stability of U.S. 
college and university presidents.  In particular, this analysis investigates differences between 
public and private college and university presidents in their likelihood of leaving office in a five 
year period, reasons for departures among presidential job-movers, and differences in their 
average length of time in office.  Additionally, this paper attempts to identify underlying causes 
of the higher job instability among public university presidents.  In particular, this study 
examines differences salaries and in the prevalence and longevity of formal written contracts 
between the private and public university presidents as potential causes of the differences in job 
stability.  
2. Literature Review 
A few studies have examined labor market outcomes for American university presidents.  
These studies have primarily focused on compensation and to a lesser degree length of time in 
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office.  For example, a handful of researchers have examined the remuneration of university 
presidents (Boulanger and Pliskin (1999), Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva (2001); Monks 
(2007); Pfeffer and Ross (1988)).  The existing studies of presidents' compensation structures 
primarily rely on data from the Chronicle of Higher Education’s online database of university presidents’ 
salaries and benefits.  Specifically, Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva (2001) examine the 
characteristics that are most highly compensated among private college and university presidents.  They 
find significant correlations between earnings and seniority and prior executive experience, as well as the 
type (Carnegie classification) and size of the institution.  They do not find consistent convincing evidence 
of a relationship between institutional performance and presidential earnings. 
 Boulanger and Pliskin (1999) also investigate determinants of private institutions' presidents' 
earnings using salary data from the Chronicle of Higher Education, for 1995-96.  They find that 
presidential remuneration is positively related to the total expenditures of an institution.  They also 
conclude that presidents of more selective institutions earn more than presidents of less selective 
institutions.  Time in office as president was also found to have a positive and significant influence on 
compensation. 
 Tang, Tang, & Tang (1996a) and Tang and Tang (1996b) also utilize data from the Chronicle of 
Higher Education to examine private university presidents’ compensation, for the academic year 1991-92.  
They too report that compensation is positively and significantly related to total expenditures, academic 
reputation rating from US News and World Report, and Carnegie classification.   
 Pfeffer and Ross (1988) use data from the College and University Personnel Association's 
(CUPA) Annual Administrative Compensation Surveys for academic years 1978-79 and 1983-84 to 
investigate presidential remuneration.  They find that both individual characteristics such as seniority, 
gender, and whether the individual was hired internally, and institutional features such as size, resources, 
4 
 
Carnegie classification, and control (public versus private) are significantly correlated with presidents' 
earnings.   
 Monks (2007) utilized data from the American Council of Education (ACE) and the 
Chronicle of Higher Education to examine differences in compensation between public and 
private doctoral university presidents.  He reported that private university presidents were 
compensated by up to 50 percent more than their public university peers, conditional upon 
institutional characteristics, time in office, age, sex, race, and field of specialization. 
  Reed (2002) examined turnover among public university presidents who were appointed 
to their office between 1987 and 1990.  She found there were no significant differences in 
turnover or length of time in office between male and female presidents, nor did she find 
significant differences in turnover by race.  She reported that approximately three fourths of 
these newly appointed presidents were still in office six years later, and that the average time in 
office was 8.54 years.  This study provides valuable benchmarks of presidential seniority, but 
unfortunately only performs a series of pair-wise comparisons between groups, without 
controlling concurrently for other factors.   
 Padilla and Ghosh (2000) also investigated university presidential turnover.  They 
analyzed the link between institutional characteristics and presidential time in office over time.  
They found that the average time in office among research I university presidents was decreasing 
markedly over time, particularly among public university presidents.  They speculated that this 
decline in longevity could be at least partly due to increases in presidential salaries.  
   This paper will contribute to the relatively sparse literature on academic presidents’ job 
spells by using the most recent data available on length of time in office and focusing on 
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differentials between public and private university presidents in job turnover.  In addition, this 
analysis examines differences between public and private university presidents in the reasons for 
job separations.  
3. Data 
The data for this analysis comes primarily from the American Council on Education’s 
(ACE) American College Presidents’ Survey, for the years 2001 and 2006.  The ACE has 
surveyed American college and university presidents approximately every five years since 
1986.  The 2001 survey contained responses from 1,181 presidents, while the 2006 survey 
included information from 2,148 college and university presidents.  These two datasets were 
merged in order to obtain a single data file of institutions that responded in both survey years.  
This matched data file contained information for the presidents of 964 institutions (see Table 
1 for sample construction).   
 Additionally, there were forty observations in the 2001 data set with a duplicate 
institutional identifying variable.  These forty observations were excluded from the sample 
used here.  Another 4 institutions that were classified as Specialty Institutions (such as 
culinary schools, or performing arts colleges) were also excluded.  Finally, 122 institutions 
were deleted because they did not report the 2001 president’s hiring year, and another 11 
were excluded because the 2006 hiring year was not reported, thus an accurate length of time 
in office could not be determined.  These restrictions resulted in a final data set of 787 
matched institutions that had valid presidential job durations, for the 2001 and 2006 survey 
years. 
6 
 
This ACE based data was merged with salary information from the Chronicle of Higher 
Education online database of executive compensation.  Because the Chronicle did not begin 
collecting and reporting presidential salaries for public universities until 2004, only the 2006 
ACE job holder could be matched with his or her 2006-2007 academic year compensation 
information.  Additionally, public presidential salary data was collected only for doctoral and 
research universities with enrollments of 10,000 students or more (and community college 
presidents), while private university presidential data was collected for colleges and 
universities of all sizes and classification.  Presidents in the subsample of the ACE data used 
in this paper that met these criteria were matched with their total financial compensation 
(salary plus benefits) from the Chronicle dataset.   
The final data set used in this analysis thus contains information obtained from the two 
ACE data sets, the Chronicle of Higher Education online executive compensation dataset, and 
IPEDS data.  Table 2 presents summary measures by survey year.  The average length of time in 
office (these are uncompleted spells in office) rose from 6.5 years in 2001 to 8.7 years in 2006.  
This difference is statistically different from zero at the 99 percent level.  Clearly, average 
overall time in the presidential office has gone up.   Furthermore, about one in four of the college 
and university presidents who held office in 2001 left their position over the next five years.   
Consistent with the increase in job duration found above, the average age of the 
officeholder increased significantly from 58.7 to 60.9.  The percentage of presidents with a field 
in law or medicine also significantly increased over this time period from 6.6 percent to 10.7 
percent.  All other individual characteristics remained quite similar over the two survey years.  It 
is, however, interesting to note that women constitute approximately one in five college and 
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university presidents, and racial minorities represent between 11 to 14 percent of university 
leaders.  Not surprisingly, the field with the highest percentage of presidents is education, 
followed by humanities, religion and the arts, the social sciences and business, the sciences and 
mathematics, and then law and medicine.   
In this matched sample of institutions approximately 38 percent of the institutions are 
publicly controlled.  Forty-four percent are baccalaureate institutions, 39 percent are masters 
institutions, and 17 percent are doctoral/research universities, using the 2001 Carnegie 
classifications. 
Table 3 presents summary measures separately for public and private institutions, by year.  It 
is clear that by 2006 presidents of public institutions had an average time in office that was 
substantially lower than their private counterparts.  While the average time in office for public 
university presidents was approximately half a year lower in 2001 (and not significantly 
different), it was one and a half years lower by 2006, and significantly different at the 5 percent 
level.  Similarly, only 22.5 percent of the private presidents in our 2001 sample had left their 
presidency by 2006, while almost 29 percent of public university presidents were no longer in 
the same position five years later.  This difference in turnover is statistically different from zero 
at the 10 percent level.  Interestingly, this difference in turnover is mostly attributable to higher 
percentages of public university presidents retiring or taking a different presidency at another 
institution.  A Chi-squared test of independence between institutional control (public-private) 
and reason for leaving one’s presidency rejects the null of independence, at the one percent level 
(test statistic = 46.6, d.f.=5).   It is also interesting to note that no private institution president 
moved to a public institution in this sample, while a few public university presidents moved to 
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private institutions.  Generally, presidents appear to stay within sectors when moving corner 
offices. 
There are notable differences between some of the individual characteristics of public and 
private university presidents, and in the type of institutions that they lead.  For example, looking 
at the individual characteristics of presidents from the 2006 survey, one observes that over 90 
percent of private institution presidents are white/non-Hispanic, while only 79 percent of public 
university presidents are white/non-Hispanic.  About 20 percent of both public and private 
institutions are led by female presidents.  Ironically, despite the lower job tenures the average 
public university president is approximately a year and a half older than his or her private 
counterpart.  Additionally, public university presidents are more likely to have a science, 
mathematics, social science or business background, while private university presidents are more 
likely to specialize in the humanities, religion, art, or education.   
These differences in fields of specialization may be the product of differences in the types of 
institutions that public and private university presidents lead.  For example, in this sample almost 
62 percent of the private institutions are baccalaureate colleges, while only 15 percent of the 
public institutions fall into this category.  Similarly, 55 percent of public universities and 29 
percent of private universities are masters institutions, respectively.  Finally, almost one third of 
the public universities in this sample are doctoral universities, while only 9 percent of the private 
universities are doctoral universities.   
In estimating differences in turnover and average length of time in the presidential office 
between public and privately controlled institutions it is important to control for these differences 
in individual and institutional characteristics, so that one can address whether presidents with 
9 
 
similar characteristics and backgrounds, of comparable institutions, do in fact have varying 
levels of job stability and reasons for leaving.      
4.  Estimation Results  
This paper estimates differences in the level of job stability of U.S. college and university 
presidents in three ways.  First, using logit estimation to determine how much more likely 
comparable public university presidents are to exit their jobs than their private peers.  Second, 
multinomial logit to investigate whether public and private university presidents depart office for 
the same reasons; and third job stability is examined by estimating differences in the length of 
time in office reported by current job holders.   
Table 4 shows the results of the logit regression.  The dichotomous dependent variable is one 
if the 2001 job holder exited the presidency of that institution by the time of the 2006 survey, and 
zero if he or she was still the president of the same institution.  Before turning to the difference 
between public and private university presidents it is interesting to note that the only statistically 
significant determinants of a president’s likelihood of leaving office are age and having a degree 
in the social sciences or business (relative to education).  The older the president, the more likely 
it is that he or she will not be the president five years later.  Similarly, presidents with a degree in 
the social sciences or business are more likely to leave office, other things equal, than those with 
a degree in education.  In fact, all other degree holders are more likely to exit their presidency 
than those with a degree in education (although not statistically significant).  This may be 
because those with a degree in education knew what they were getting into, or because they have 
fewer alternative employment options of comparable appeal to a college or university 
presidency.   
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Presidents of public universities are significantly (at the 5 percent level) more likely to leave 
office than private university presidents, conditional on Carnegie classification, sex, age, race, 
advanced degree, and field of specialization.  Specifically, public university presidents are 52 
percent more likely to exit their presidencies over this 5 year period than private university 
presidents.   For example, while a private university president may have only a 12 percent 
predicted probability of departing office over a 5 year period, a public university president would 
have approximately an 18 percent probability of leaving office over the same time period. 
The second column of Table 4 incorporates the presidents’ current time in office in order to 
estimate the probability of departing conditional on time in office.  While the longer a president 
has been in office the greater the probability of exiting, this effect is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels; however, conditional on duration in office public university presidents are 
56 percent more likely to exit their presidencies than are private university presidents.  These 
results clearly suggest that public university presidents have less job stability than private 
university presidents. 
Table 5 utilizes a multinomial logit to estimate whether public and private university 
presidents depart office for the same reasons.  The six reasons for leaving office presented in 
Table 3 (retired, university appointment, non-academic appointment, private university 
presidency, public university presidency, and other) were collapsed into three categories for the 
multinomial logit regression due to the small ( or even zero) sample sizes in some of the 
outcomes.  The “other” reason category contained very disparate reasons for leaving office such 
as forced to resign, resigned for health reasons, died in office, or became a bishop.  The 
observations in the “other” category are excluded from the multinomial logit estimation due to 
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their relatively small cell size and the disparate underlying reasons.  The remaining reasons for 
departure were collapsed into “retired”, “took another (non-presidency) job”, or “took a new 
presidency”.  The multinomial logit results presented in Table 5 show the likelihood of departing 
to one of these three options relative to staying in office over the 5 year period, from 2001 to 
2006.  Once again, before turning to differences between public and private university presidents 
it is interesting to note some of the other factors influencing reasons for job separation.  For 
example, presidents with degrees in the fields of social science, business, medicine, or law are 
significantly more likely to leave office to take a “non-presidency” job relative to presidents with 
a background in education.  Additionally, presidents of masters institutions are significantly less 
likely to take another job or another presidency than their counterparts from doctoral institutions.  
Also, as expected older presidents are more likely to retire and less likely to take another 
presidency.  Surprisingly, older presidents are more likely to take a non-presidency job, although 
this result is only significant at the 10 percent level.  Similarly, the longer a president has been in 
office the more likely he or she is to retire and less likely to take a new presidency.  Finally, 
while public university presidents are slightly more likely than private university presidents to 
retire or take another non-presidency job these results are not statistically significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels.  The primary reason for public university presidents’ higher job 
turnover is that they are significantly (at the one percent level) more likely to leave office to take 
a presidency at another institution.  Specifically, public university presidents are 269 percent 
(exp(1.305)-1) more likely than comparable private university presidents to leave office over a 
five year period in order to take another presidency.   
Given that public university presidents are more likely to exit their jobs, it is expected that 
they would therefore have shorter lengths of time in office.  Measuring job durations in 2001 and 
12 
 
2006 will allow us to estimate whether job lengths are changing over time, and whether 
differences in job lengths between public and private university presidents are changing over 
time.  Additionally, the 2006 data can be matched with salary data from the Chronicle of Higher 
Education to investigate whether differences in job length seem to be at least partially correlated 
with differences in salaries. 
Table 6 presents OLS estimates of the difference in the length of time in office (uncompleted 
spells) between public and private university presidents conditional on the factors outlined 
above.    The dependent variable is the natural log of length of time in office so that the 
coefficients approximate the percentage effects of the regressors on job duration.  Again it is 
interesting to note that across the two survey years, presidents with fields other than education 
have lower levels of average job duration.  Not surprisingly, older presidents have greater 
average length of time in office. 
Conditional upon the regressors in Table 6, the increase in the intercept coefficients imply 
that the baseline length of time in office was approximately 56 percent shorter in 2001 than 
2006.  This result suggests that presidential job durations increased over this time period, ceteris 
paribus.  Job stability (amount of time in office) among college and university presidents 
increased from 2001 to 2006. 
In 2001, public university presidents had an average time in office that was approximately 20 
percent less (exp(-.225)-1) than private university presidents.  In 2006, this difference was 23 
percent.  Consistent with the results on the probability of exiting office, public university 
presidents have lower average job lengths than private university presidents, suggesting less job 
stability, even as overall job stability seems to be increasing.  One possible reason for the 
13 
 
differences in job stability may be due to differences in salary levels between public and private 
university presidents.  It has been documented elsewhere (Monks (2007), Pfeffer and Ross 
(1988)) that private university presidents are paid significantly more than public university 
presidents.  This discrepancy in salaries may be what is prompting more public university 
presidents to leave office in order to take another, presumably higher paying, presidency at a 
different institution.3   
Controlling for presidential salaries would allow for the estimation of average length of time 
in office conditional on remuneration, and thus to examine whether the public university 
discount in job length is reduced or eliminated once salary differentials are accounted for.  As 
mentioned above, the Chronicle of Higher Education only reports public university presidential 
salaries for doctoral and research institutions with 10,000 students or more.  The original 
subsample of matched ACE institutions used in this analysis contains 137 doctoral institutions.  
The Chronicle reported salaries that matched the same office holder for the 2006-2007 academic 
year for 113 of these institutions.  Specification 1 of Table 7 reports the OLS results on this 
subsample, without controlling for salary, in order to illustrate that public university presidents in 
this group have average lengths of time in office that are comparably lower than the overall 
sample.  The coefficient on the public university variable in the complete sample and in this 
subsample are -.258 and -.298, respectively.  Public doctoral university presidents have job 
durations that are statistically significantly lower than private doctoral university presidents, at 
the 5 percent level.  Specification 2 of Table 7 includes presidential salary among the regressors.  
                                                     
3
 An attempt to compare 2006 presidential salaries at departing and arriving institutions, among job-movers who 
took new presidencies, proved futile, as a number of job-movers took positions at institutions that did not participate 
in the Chronicle of Higher Education’s salary survey. 
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The higher the presidential salary, the longer the presidential length of time in office, on average 
(at the 10 percent level).  Additionally, the public university effect is now one third lower and no 
longer statistically significant, at conventional levels.  It appears that approximately one third of 
the public university effect on job duration is attributable to salary differences with the private 
sector.  Conditional on presidential salaries a large portion of the public university job turnover 
relative to the private sector is reduced. 
Of course, there may be the problem of endogeneity in this result if job duration is both 
caused by salary and a determinant of salary itself.  Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva (2001) 
found that seniority was significant in predicting presidential salaries, at least among private 
university presidents.  In order to address this potential problem, I use two-stage least squares.  
The first-stage regression is identified by using revenue per student, the number of full time 
equivalent students, and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the president held a previous 
presidency elsewhere.4  None of these three variables were found to be statistically significant 
when regressed against length of time in office, but all were individually statistically significant 
in determining presidential salaries (with a subset F-test value of 17.62, p-value less than .01). 
Column 3 of Table 7 presents the results of the two stage least squares regression.  The natural 
log of salary was not found to be statistically significant in determining job duration suggesting 
that causality is likely running from duration to remuneration.  Additionally, conditional on 
salary the coefficient on holding the presidency of a public institution is once again negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.  These results imply that even conditional 
                                                     
4
 I also used average faculty salary as an instrument with similar results.  Results not shown. 
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on salaries presidents in the public sector of higher education have significantly shorter job 
durations than their counterparts in the private sector of higher education.     
All of the above results lead to the conclusion that presidents in the public sector of U.S. 
higher education have higher job turnover and shorter job durations than their peers with 
comparable observable individual characteristics at similar institutions, and that a majority of 
this difference in turnover is attributable to the higher incidence of public university presidents 
departing to take presidencies at other institutions.  The ACE survey asked presidents if they had 
a formal written employment contract with their institution.  While 77 percent of private 
university presidents indicated that they had a formal written contract, only 59 percent of public 
university presidents reported that they had a formal written contract with their university (see 
Table 8).  Of those that reported a written contract, the length of the contract was notably shorter 
for public versus private university presidents.   For example, 8 percent of public university 
presidents had a contract of unspecified length, such as at will, or pleasure of the board, while 
only 3 percent of private university presidents’ contract lengths were not clearly specified.    
Additionally, fully 58 percent of public university presidents had contracts of 3 years or less 
(including rolling contracts), while 49 percent of private university presidents had contracts of 
this length.  On the other hand, 38 percent of private university presidents had contracts of 5 
years or more, while only 25 percent of public university presidents enjoyed contracts of this 
longevity.  Clearly, private university boards of trustees seem significantly more inclined to 
provide their presidents with formal written contracts of a specified and more generous length 
than are public university boards.   
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5. Conclusion 
The above empirical evidence is unequivocal in illustrating that four year public 
university presidents have higher job turnover, are more likely to leave to take another 
presidency, and thus have shorter job spells than private university presidents.  These results 
are conditional on individual demographic and background characteristics and institutional 
attributes.  This heightened level of job instability among public university presidents seems 
at least in part to be the product of lower salaries and a dearth of formal written contracts of a 
specified and reasonable duration.  It appears that public universities and their boards of 
trustees are either reluctant or unable due to legislative constraints to competitively 
compensate their presidents and to enter into formal employment contracts with the chief 
executive officers of their institutions.   
The greater job security and salary advantage of holding the top office of a private higher 
education institution relative to a public institution creates a double edged advantage for 
private institutions in attracting and retaining talented executives and administrators.  If 
public institutions continue to be unable to compensate their presidents at a level competitive 
with private institutions and are reticent in entering into formal written contracts that provide 
the president a reasonable level of job security and recourse, then ambitious and talented 
managers with options in the private higher education sector will avail themselves of these 
options and there will be a clear brain drain from the public to the private sector among 
university administrators.
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Table 1 
Sample construction 
No. of 
Observations 
ACE 2001 Presidential Survey 1,181 
ACE 2006 Presidential Survey 2,148 
Institutions in both surveys 964   
Excluded obs. based on: 
     Obs. With duplicate unit ids 40 
     Specialty Universities 4 
  
     2001 hiring date not reported 122 
     2006 hiring date not reported 11 
Final Sample 787   
 
20 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary Measures 
2001 2006 
Years in Office 6.5 8.7 *** 
% change president 25.2% ---- 
between 2001 and 2006 
Age 58.7 60.9 *** 
Female 0.1868 0.202 
White/Non-Hispanic 0.8882 0.864   
Field of Highest Degree 
Science and 
Mathematics 0.1385 0.1347 
Social Science and Business 0.2376 0.2236 
Humanities, Religion, 
Arts 0.2554 0.2592 
Education 0.2732 0.2757 
Law and Medicine 0.0661 0.1067 *** 
Institutional Characteristics 
Public 0.3787 
Baccalaureate 0.4409 
Masters 0.385 
Doctorate 0.1741   
No. of institutions 787 
 
*** (**, *) indicates statistically different from 2001 value at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Table 3 
Summary measures by control and year     
Private Public 
2001 2006 2001 2006 
Years in Office 7.648 10.2474 *** 7.1678 8.7383 ** b 
% change president 22.5% 28.9% *         
     % retire    9.2%     12.1% 
     % university appt.    2.7%    4.4% 
     % non-academic appt.    3.5%      1.3%* 
     % private presidency    4.3%       1.3%** 
     % public presidency    0.0%         8.1%*** 
     % other    2.9%    1.7% 
    
Age 58.146 60.4126 *** 59.6487 a 61.8047 *** b 
Female 0.1963 0.2004 0.1711 0.2047 
White/Non-Hispanic 0.9305 0.9121 0.8188 a 0.7852 b 
Field of Highest Degree 
Science and Mathematics 0.0798 0.09 0.2349 a 0.2081 b 
Social Science and 
Business 0.2311 0.1943 0.2483 0.2718 b 
Humanities, Religion, 
Arts 0.317 0.3047 0.1544 a 0.1846 b 
Education 0.2863 0.3108 0.2517 0.2181 b 
Law and Medicine 0.0532 0.1002 *** 0.0872 0.1174 
Institutional Characteristics 
Baccalaureate 0.6196 0.1477 a 
Masters 0.2863 0.547 a 
Doctorate 0.0941 0.3054 a 
No. of institutions 489 298 
 
*** (**, *) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
a indicates statistically different from 2001 private; b indicates statistically different from 2006 
private 
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Table 4 
Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable is equal to one if a new president from 2001 to 2006 
 
  Coefficients 
 Marginal 
Effects 
 
Coefficients 
 Marginal 
Effects 
Intercept -6.070 *** -5.523 *** 
(1.147) 
 
(1.195) 
 
    Public Institution 0.416 ** 52% 0.447 ** 56% 
(0.210) 
 
(0.212) 
 
    Time in Office ----- 
 
0.028 
 
  
(0.018) 
 
    Baccalaureate College 0.350   0.331   
(0.270) 
 
(0.271) 
 
    Masters University -0.383   -0.428 * 
(0.255) 
 
(0.257) 
 
    Female 0.185   0.205   
(.0.221) 
 
(.0.221) 
 
    White/Non-Hispanic 0.230   0.218   
(0.285) 
 
(0.286) 
 
    Age 0.060 *** 0.048 *** 
(0.016) 
 
(0.018) 
 
    Advanced Degree 0.475   0.487   
(0.457) 
 
(0.460) 
 
    Soc. Sci. & Business 0.466 * 0.516 ** 
(0.242) 
 
(0.246) 
 
    Sci. & Mathematics 0.456   0.509   
(0.292) 
 
(0.295) 
 
    Medicine & Law 0.112   0.183   
(0.388) 
 
(0.389) 
 
    Humanities & Arts 0.305   0.349   
(0.243) (0.245) 
Notes: 
Also included among the regressors but not shown are dummy variables 
for missing values of age and adv. degree. 
*** (**, *) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Table 5 
Multinomial logit results 
Dependent Variable is retired, took other job, or took new presidency relative to staying 
current presidency, 2001 to 2006 
    Other   Other  
Retire  Job  Presidency  
Intercept -15.657 *** -6.091 *** 3.062 * 
(2.121) 
 
(1.974) 
 
(1.786) 
 
      Public Institution 0.137   0.100   1.305 *** 
(0.319) 
 
(0.393) 
 
(0.402) 
 
      Time in Office 0.077 *** -0.077 * 0.002 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.043) 
 
      Baccalaureate College 0.213   0.154   -0.067   
(0.430) 
 
(0.448) 
 
(0.466) 
 
      Masters University -0.037   -0.963 ** -0.959 ** 
(0.388) 
 
(0.483) 
 
(0.448) 
 
      Female 0.214   0.067   0.476   
(.0.336) 
 
(.0.422) 
 
(.0.384) 
 
      White/Non-Hispanic 0.705   -0.061   0.345   
(0.528) 
 
(0.516) 
 
(0.491) 
 
      Age 0.189 *** 0.058 * -0.115 *** 
(0.032) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
 
      Soc. Sci. & Business 0.354   0.941 ** -0.187   
(0.387) 
 
(0.473) 
 
(0.474) 
 
      Science & Mathematics 0.686   -0.007   0.631   
(0.443) 
 
(0.665) 
 
(0.481) 
 
      Medicine & Law 0.111   1.197 ** -0.850   
(0.698) 
 
(0.582) 
 
(0.796) 
 
      Humanities & Arts 0.081   0.699   0.248   
(0.381) (0.482) (0.439) 
Chi-square fit 186.800     
p-value 0.00001     
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Table 6 
OLS Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable is  the Natural Log of Length of Time in Office 
  
    
    2001  2006  
Intercept -1.783 *** -0.971 ***   
(0.323) 
 
(0.283) 
 
    Public Institution -0.225 *** -20% -0.258 *** -23% 
(0.064) 
 
(0.053) 
 
    Baccalaureate College 0.055   0.010   
(0.084) 
 
(0.070) 
 
    Masters University 0.182 ** 0.096   
(0.079) 
 
(0.066) 
 
    Female -0.011   -0.084   
(.0.067) 
 
(.0.056) 
 
    White/Non-Hispanic -0.025   0.022   
(0.084) 
 
(0.066) 
 
    Age 0.056 *** 0.049 *** 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
    Advanced Degree 0.172   0.253 ** 
(0.126) 
 
(0.108) 
 
    Soc. Sci. & Business -0.209 *** -0.121 * 
(0.073) 
 
(0.064) 
 
    Science & Mathematics -0.173 * -0.267 *** 
(0.091) 
 
(0.077) 
 
    Medicine & Law -0.315 *** -0.105   
(0.114) 
 
(0.080) 
 
    Humanities & Arts -0.187 *** -0.157 ** 
(0.072) (0.061) 
R-square 0.256 0.202 
Notes: 
Also included among the regressors but not shown are dummy variables 
for missing values of age and advanced degree. 
*** (**, *) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Table 7 
Estimation Results based on 2006 Survey 
Dependent Variable is  the Natural Log of Length of Time in Office 
OLS 
 Specification 1   Specification 2  2SLS 
Intercept -2.279 *** -6.372 *** 0.316 
(0.793) 
 
(2.492) 
 
(4.013) 
    Public Institution -0.298 ** -0.203   -0.359 ** 
(0.130) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.156) 
    Natural Log of Salary ----- 
 
0.313 * 
-0.198 
  
(0.181) 
 
(0.301) 
    Female -0.129   -0.136   -0.125 
(.0.194) 
 
(.0.192) 
 
(0.189) 
    White/Non-Hispanic -0.169   -0.209   -0.142 
(0.198) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.196) 
    Age 0.075 *** 0.075 *** 0.075 *** 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
    Advanced Degree 0.008   0.060   -0.027 
(0.371) 
 
(0.369) 
 
(0.365) 
    Soc. Sci. & Business -0.115   -0.155   -0.090 
(0.227) 
 
(0.226) 
 
(0.224) 
    Science & Mathematics -0.045   -0.122   0.003 
(0.229) 
 
(0.231) 
 
(0.235) 
    Medicine & Law 0.120   0.090   0.137 
(0.242) 
 
(0.240) 
 
(0.237) 
    Humanities & Arts -0.013   0.001   -0.021 
(0.256) (0.253) (0.249) 
R-square 0.304 0.324 0.27 
adjusted R-square 0.236 0.250 0.191 
Notes: 
Also included among the regressors but not shown are dummy variables 
for missing values of age and advanced degree. 
*** (**, *) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Table 8 
Existence of a written contract and the length of contract 
Public Private 
% With a written contract 59% 77% 
Length of Contract 
(those with a contract) 
Not specifieda 12 8% 9 3% 
1 year 30 20% 43 13% 
2 years / 2 years rolling 7 5% 18 5% 
3 years / 3 years rolling 50 33% 102 31% 
4 years 15 10% 31 9% 
5 years / 5 years rolling 30 20% 110 33% 
6 or more years 7 5% 18 5% 
     Total Responses 151 331 
 
a
  responses include: at will, indefinite, pleasure of the board,  
   pleasure of the president. 
 
 
